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Abstract— The lack of good secure development practice for app 
developers threatens everyone who uses mobile software. Current 
practice emphasizes checklists of processes and security errors to 
avoid, and has not proved effective in the application development 
domain. Based on analysis of interviews with relevant security 
experts, we suggest that secure app development requires ‘dialectic’: 
challenging dialog with a range of counterparties, continued 
throughout the development cycle. By further studying the different 
dialectic techniques possible in programmers’ communications, we 
shall be able to empower app developers to produce the secure 
software that we need. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There are now more than 2 billion smartphone users in the 
world. We use apps to communicate, apps to plan, apps to 
manage our finances, apps to do our shopping, and apps to 
remember our security credentials. Increasingly those apps are 
handling our sensitive personal information, and thus it is 
becoming vital to ensure our security and privacy. 
Unfortunately, there is evidence that the developers of 
smartphone apps are not delivering this security. Enck et al. 
[19] used static analysis to study 1100 commercial Android 
apps in 2011, and  found privacy issues in a majority of apps 
available to download.  App security solution provider Bluebox 
analyzed the top five payment apps in 2015 [8] and found 
vulnerabilities permitting financial theft in all of them, along 
with further privacy issues. Both surveys suggested that the 
errors were avoidable; app programmers could have made 
choices that would have prevented the issues.  
In addition, there is widespread concern about the problem. 
The Ponemon Institute carried out a IBM-funded survey in 
2015 of 640 individuals from organizations developing apps in 
the US [41], and found that 77% believed that securing mobile 
apps was ‘very hard’, and that 73% percent believed that 
developer lack of understanding of security issues was a major 
contributor to the problem. 
These studies demonstrate that existing industry practices 
are insufficient to provide the application security and privacy 
we need. To address this problem we could look for 
improvements to environments and APIs; we could look at 
tools to automate security improvements; or we can look at 
ways in which we can help app programmers themselves to 
improve security given existing constraints. All are valuable 
approaches; we chose the third option. The research question 
we formulated during the work is therefore: 
What techniques and ideas lead to the development of better 
secure app software? 
We found little existing research on what works well. 
Current practice emphasizes checklists of processes and errors, 
along with static analysis of code. To improve practice, 
however, we need an understanding of what works in the real 
world.   
Since there is little existing theory on this subject, we had 
no basis for an experimental approach; we have no hypotheses 
to test. Written or email surveys could be useful to find out 
current practice from a list of options, but are unsuitable of the 
kinds of open question that generates theory. We therefore 
conducted a Constructivist Grounded Theory [11] study, 
involving face-to-face interviews with a dozen experts whose 
cumulative experience totaled well over 100 years of secure 
app development, to develop theory on the best techniques 
available for developers.  
Our early analysis of the interviews [48,49] found a wide 
range of difference between interviewees, and concluded that 
the discipline is relatively immature. This paper builds on this 
earlier work and goes beyond by contributing a catalogue of 
techniques to empower app developers to deliver secure 
software. In identifying these techniques, we found surprising 
discrepancies between the current industry understanding of the 
approach required by app developers, and the experts’ 
recommendations. Specifically we concluded that the 
management approach of process checklists offers little help to 
app developers; and that even ‘whole system security’ 
approaches do not get close enough to day-to-day programmer 
experience to be very useful. 
Instead, we identified that the most important and 
successful secure development techniques share a quality we 
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call ‘dialectic’, meaning learning by challenging. These 
techniques use dialog with a range of counterparties to achieve 
security in an effective and economical way. The increase in 
security comes from the developers’ continued interaction with 
the resulting challenges, not from passive learning.  
This suggests that, like the Monty Python character who 
requests an argument [35], in the words in the paper’s title, we 
need developers to actively seek out arguments and challenges. 
The novel contribution of this work is to provide: 
 A shift in perspective from artifacts to communication, 
 An analysis of secure development practices that 
challenges conventional processes and checklists, and 
 A theory linking a range of practices that encourage 
secure behaviors by app developers, 
In the rest of this paper, section II explores existing work; 
section III explains the methodology in more detail; sections IV 
to X  explore the techniques in detail, examining the problem 
each solves, and suggesting how teams typically implement 
each one; then section XI explores the techniques as a whole 
and suggests approaches for future research. 
II. RELATED WORK  
We looked for related work in three areas: 
 How programmers learn security,  
 Resources to help programmers improve security, and  
 Techniques to help teams improve 
A. How Programmers Learn Security  
We first consider work on how app developers learn about 
security. Balebako et al. surveyed and interviewed over 200 
app developers, and concluded that most approached security 
issues using web search, or by consulting peers [5].  
A survey by Acar et al. reached similar conclusions; and 
they also determined experimentally the surprising result that 
programmers using digital books achieved better security than 
those using web search [1]. Yskout et al. tested experimentally 
the effect of using security patterns in server design; the results 
suggested a benefit but were statistically inconclusive [52]. 
There are a number of papers exploring the reasons why 
programmers introduce weaknesses in mobile apps, especially 
Android, and possible reasons for them. For example, Egele et 
al. [17] studied the misuse of cryptographic APIs, concluding 
that it was widespread and required better APIs; Fahl et al. 
studied SSL use [20], concluded some apps were vulnerable to 
man-in-the-middle attacks, and suggested an improved API to 
solve the problems. However, this work has not been used to 
improve programmer performance. 
B. Resources to Help Programmers 
Turning to resources, one might expect that a very effective 
contribution to app security would be books explaining how to 
do secure app development. Unfortunately, few seem to exist 
covering a higher level than code. There are many good works 
describing the theory and practice of software security, such as 
Gollman’s ‘Computer Security’ [24], Schneier’s ‘Secrets and 
Lies’ [43] and Anderson’s ‘Security Engineering’ [2]; these are 
particularly valuable for introducing the concepts of ‘whole 
system security’, but all work at a level that isn’t helpful as 
anything but background reference for a software developer.  
Instead, the most useful learning books for software 
developers do tend to be those that convey information in a 
relatively terse and readable form, and in manageable chunks. 
A good example is Howard et al.’s ‘24 Deadly Sins of Software 
Security’ [27]; its format is similar to that of the patterns 
literature. Targeted specifically at particular platforms are 
books explaining the Android security model and development 
techniques; examples include ‘Pro Android 4’ [30] and 
‘Android Security Internals’ [18]. For iOS there are 
equivalents, such as ‘Learning iOS Security’ [6]; though this is 
more a description of security features than a guide to avoiding 
security issues. 
Some of the most popular1 security books are the ones with 
a platform-specific ‘Black Hat’ (attacker) approach. For 
example the Android Hacker’s Handbook [16], and its 
corresponding versions for iOS and web apps, contain a good 
deal about exploits against the operating system, a certain 
amount about analyzing existing apps, but little about how to 
guard against exploits as a developer. Chell’s Mobile Hacker’s 
Handbook [12] takes a similar approach, covering iOS, 
Android and even Blackberry platforms, and does provide 
limited advice for developers.  
The community-written OWASP Top Ten Mobile Risks 
site [39] is a widely accessed 2  resource detailing specific 
programming issues and how to avoid them. Its authority and 
availability make it very effective, though again it does not 
consider ‘whole system security’ issues. 
App programmers tend to use web search and discussion 
sites such as Stack Overflow as their primary source of 
information on security [1]. Unfortunately these lack overview 
discussions [7], making them valuable in helping programmers 
sort out problems they know they have, but does not point out 
problems that they do not know they may have; most security 
problems are likely to be of this second type. Discussion sites 
have a second problem related to security: their answers on 
security matters tend to be of questionable accuracy especially 
when they quote code. Acar et al. [1] analyzed answers on 
Stack Overflow to app security questions, worryingly finding 
around 50% of solutions to a set of security questions to 
contain insecure code snippets. 
C. Techniques to Help Teams Improve 
Two projects, by Xie et al. and Nguyen et al., [37,51] have 
developed IDE-based tools to teach programmers by detecting 
possible security flaws in Android developments. The approach 
is promising, but obviously requires programmers to adopt the 
tools; also no papers are yet available validating their 
effectiveness. Others, such as Near and Jackson, and Lerch et 
al., [31,36] have code analysis tools to detect security defects; 
these work but provide only limited feedback to developers. 
One might expect the most effective approach to be a 
prescriptive set of instructions telling programmers what to do, 
                                                          
1 Based on Amazon.com rankings as at January 2016 
2 Based on Google rankings in February 2016 
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a ‘Secure Software Development Lifecycle’ (SSDL) such as 
those promoted by Microsoft [34] and others. However Conradi 
and Dyba [14], among others, identified that programmers have 
difficulty with, and resist learning from, formal written 
routines, and this appears to have been the experience with 
SSDLs in practice [22]. So, since about 2010 several of the 
SSDLs have been replaced by ‘Security Capability Maturity 
Models’ [33,40], to allow management influence on software 
security at a corporate level based on measurements using 
checklists of processes used to improve security. These are 
effective [32] at defining what development teams should 
achieve, but provide little help to developers on how best to 
achieve it. 
This means that for the majority of app developers who do 
not have the support of formal process-driven organizations 
[45] we need to find a lightweight, non-prescriptive approach. 
D. Limitations of Existing Literature 
Consistent in all this literature, is a lack of theory how to 
guide development teams to achieve security in the 
specification, architecture, and design activities. Instead, we see 
mainly checklists at for the coding activity alone.  
Moreover, while ‘whole system security’ experts such as 
Anderson [2] are excellent at driving a holistic, rather than 
purely technical, view of software security, they rarely consider 
the team interactions needed to achieve the results. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
This section explains our choice of methodology, briefly 
outlines Grounded Theory, and introduces the research 
participants. 
A. Choice of Methodology 
Our purpose in the research was to generate knowledge 
about good approaches to secure development. Two 
perceptions drove the research approach: 
 We had found few resources indicating how to tackle 
app development security.  
 Existing literature tended to be negative in approach, 
listing things the developer must not do; this contrasts 
with the kinds of books preferred by developers, which 
we observe tend to be positive in outlook. 
Our major resource was personal connections and links to 
industry specialists in app development, including in secure app 
development. Since our aim was to generate, rather than to test, 
theory, we chose Grounded Theory as our primary research 
method. Our study used semi-structured interviews over 6 
months with a dozen such experts. To encourage positivity, we 
used elements of Appreciative Inquiry [15] in our questioning: 
the ‘Discovery’ of best practice and the ‘Dream’ of ideal 
practice. 
B. Grounded Theory 
Grounded Theory [23] uses textual analysis of unstructured 
text to make theory generation into a dependable process. It 
requires line-by-line analysis of everything relevant that is 
available to the researcher: interview transcripts, relevant 
research literature, field notes from observation and anything 
else that can reduce to text form. The process is iterative, with 
analysis of initial findings from interviews or similar leading to 
changes in the research thrust and direction.  
We used the Constructivist GT variant [11], acknowledging 
the effects of the researcher on the results. We followed the 
principles for software engineering GT described by Stol et al. 
[44]. We recorded interviews and transcribed them manually; 
organization of the data used the commercial tool Nvivo; 
coding, memoing and sorting were all by the lead author. 
The interviews consulted the participants as experts rather 
than as subjects. They addressed what each had found to be 
most successful in their experience in secure software 
development. Following the principles of Appreciative Inquiry, 
questions avoided discussion on what does not work and 
concentrated on the most effective practice known to each 
interviewee.  
C. Research Participants 
Though we chose the participants for their experience with 
app security, most drew on experience with a far wider range of 
software domains in answering the questions. Table 1 shows 
the interviewees, with an indication of organization size (S for 
solo or less than 10 people; M for up to 1000 people; and L for 
larger and government organizations), a suggestion of their 
years’ experience with app security, and a description of their 
main day-to-day role. All had worked extensively with UK or 
US-based organizations; all but P5, P8, and P10 had an original 
background as programmers. 
Table 1: Interviewees, organization sizes, experience and roles 
ID S Y Typical Role 
P1 S 2 Developing apps for business clients 
P2 M 10 Leading large security-focused team 
P3 L 8 Developing user-facing web services 
P4 S 20 Designing and implementing smart card software 
P5 M 5 Architecting and promoting a secure service 
P6 L 20 Consulting on app and IoT security 
P7 M 10 Developing and architecting OS services 
P8 L 10 Architecting mobile phone operator services 
P9 L 5 Designing and protecting web-based services 
P10 S 15 Architecting and promoting app technologies 
P11 L 10 Designing OS security enhancements 
P12 S 20 Developing apps for business clients 
 
In the following sections, quotations from the interviewees 
are in italics. We have edited them to protect confidentiality 
and indicate context: square brackets show additions and 
replacements; ellipses show removals. 
IV. INTRODUCING DIALECTIC 
Grounded Theory emphasizes that the theory generated 
should cover the greatest variation in the data. Our initial 
analysis of the transcribed interviews [48] showed very 
significant variations between experts, suggesting that the 
discipline is relatively immature, and that our experts were 
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merely providing a taxonomy of all the ‘whole system security’ 
techniques.  
Looking to explore in more detail how programmers were 
to achieve this taxonomy, we reanalyzed the interviews. We 
found to our surprise that they contained little mention of 
important parts of the ‘Whole System Security’ taxonomy: for 
example devising mitigations or using checklists of possible 
errors. Indeed some interviewees explicitly described these as 
unimportant.  
Instead, we observed that the core theme was the nature of 
the developer’s interaction with external parties: a friendly 
adversarial interaction. The word ‘dialectic’ had surfaced in our 
earlier work [48], and we realized it was the common theme to 
all these interactions. ‘Dialectic’ is the finding out of 
knowledge, especially logical inconsistencies, through one 
person questioning another. It first appeared as the technique 
used by the Greek philosopher Socrates in his dialogs.  
Using dialectic addresses a particular weakness in much 
existing secure development research, namely that emphasis on 
code level security often misses possible exploits based on the 
functionality and system design – or may prove unnecessarily 
costly: 
So implicit in [conventional thinking] is the notion that 
programmers decide what they are doing [only] in code … 
being told to put something in place without them 
understanding the greater implication. (P9) 
Instead, developers need to think what approaches an 
attacker might use to gain benefit from the system they are 
producing, and then to decide how to thwart those approaches. 
Yes, the question is 'who is the attacker, who is the bad guy, 
who is the threat model you are dealing with?' (P3)
This is a very different approach from ‘normal 
programming’. It requires developers to think in different ways.  
They are very devious. There are exploits that they have 
realized which are, well, you wouldn't really think like that if 
you were an engineer (P2) 
It was not difficult to work out why our experts should 
view dialectic as a solution. Unlike other forms of software 
quality such as performance or reliability, security involves the 
idea of someone different: an attacker who will use very 
different ways of thinking. To deal with such threats, a 
developer needs to think ‘outside the box’; the easiest way to 
achieve that is with challenges from others. 
A. Specific Dialectic Techniques 
From the GT analysis, we have drawn out six specific 
techniques that illustrate these kinds of dialectic challenges. 




Ideation sessions to derive possible 
attackers and attacks on the system 
Negotiated 
security 
Communicating security decisions in ways 
their stakeholders can understand, to 




Effective communication with other 
development teams to ensure security 
Security 
challenge 
Using professional and in-team security 








Gathering continuous feedback from the 
use of the system, and responding with 
continuous upgrades and interactive 
defenses. 
We observe that these techniques characterize themselves 
in terms of the source of the challenge to the programming 
team: other team members; tools; other roles in the software 
development process; and the consequences of end use. 
Sections V to X  show the techniques, and the counterparties 
involved with each.  
In each case, the dialectic continues throughout the 
development cycle; and in each case, it is always two-way: the 
experts state that the increase in security comes from the 
interaction with the challenges, not from a passive 
understanding of the challenge.  
We do not have evidence to claim that dialectic provides 
the best techniques for achieving security; however, our study 
suggests that dialectic communication strongly correlates with 
effective software security. 
Sections V to X explore each technique in detail. Each 
includes an illustration and illustrative quotation, followed by 
an ‘Exploration’ section discussing the context of the problem, 
and a ‘Solution’ section describing how the interviewees 
suggest addressing it. The academic paper format restricts the 
length of each description; fuller versions are available in the 
first author’s MSc thesis [47] 






I think the things that are the most challenging around 
security really are trying to understand the threat landscape 
and trying to understand how threats are realized. (P2). 
A. Exploration 
Any system can be broken with sufficient determination, 
ingenuity, and resources.  
Every security system can be broken. Period.  There are 
even ways of getting the certificates off a phone, by freezing 
the phone and reading the memory. There is nothing you can 
do to stop a truly determined person to getting in, short of 
dropping it into a nuclear furnace. The best you can do is 
make it difficult enough for them, that they will lose interest – 
that it's not worth the trouble. (P7) 
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I quickly realized that no system is ever unbreakable (P9) 
As a result, secure development is not a matter of making a 
completely secure system. Instead, it becomes a question of 
which defenses to implement: where one should spend the time 
and effort defending the system to deter the largest and most 
damaging potential exploits. Making those choices requires an 
understanding of the potential attackers: 
I think it is actually very important to understand the 
motivations behind why somebody is hacking the system. We 
try to address the motivations of the attackers, versus the 
technical aspects - just locking it down for the sake of locking 
it down. (P11) 
Neither attacker profiles not attack descriptions, however, 
are conventional knowledge for a software developer. So how 
do they best obtain them?  
B. Solution 
Use brainstorming techniques to identify both attackers and 
possible exploits. Brainstorming is a form of dialectic that uses 
interaction with a range of people with different outlooks to 
create knowledge and ideas that were not obvious beforehand.  
The first step generates profiles of likely attackers. This 
means querying experience with similar products, discussing 
with others in the industry, and consulting experts. The 
attackers may not be the obvious ones: 
There are clear reasons why someone would want to attack 
a bank, but actually the real reasons for attacking a bank are 
very seldom to do with trying to get financial rewards. It is 
much more around what information you can get about 
people. Banks hold information about people. So [it might be] 
a private investigator who is trying to track someone, or a 
hostage situation, where people might have done things, or 
simply learning more about behavior. (P9) 
The second step is to use brainstorming sessions for attack 
profiling.  
I was involved in a lot of conversations about trying to think 
about doing really evil things, so I think in order to protect 
people from harm we have to think about how harm can be 
done. So, brain-storming bad intent is part of the life, really. 
(P5) 
These brainstorming sessions include people with different 
roles, especially testers, penetration testers, app security code 
reviewers, and security specialists.  
“One of the things I like to do with the [penetration testing] 
guys is to, if you sit down and say 'what are all the different 
ways you could subvert this system'. It is quite common to 
come up with 20, 30, 40, 50 in five or ten minutes of 
brainstorming. I bet you, you wouldn't think of half of them.” 
(P2)  
An excellent concise recipe for running these sessions is in 
the seminal work on negotiation, Fisher et al.’s ‘Getting to Yes’ 
[21], whose chapter ‘Invent Options for Mutual Gain’ contains 
a step-by-step prescription for an effective brainstorming 
process. Although the illustration shows the brainstorming as 
being with others in the programming team, for solo developers 
it will typically be with clients, members of related technical 
teams, and other stakeholders. 
Particularly with development teams using agile 
approaches, this ideation process continues informally 
throughout the initial development project, and into the 
subsequent deployment and later lifetime of the product. The 
most security-capable teams included attacks and motivations 
found in the course of deploying the app, and throughout the 
software product lifecycle.  
The other thing, is … [to] reward proactive thinking and 
this is two levels of that: trying to think what could happen 
next, how could it go wrong, what am I missing, but then the 
next level of reward, is rewarding people for research. And 
thinking about how to do harm. Actively encourage them to 
think like a hacker. (P5) 






For businesses it is a risk based approach which they need 
to understand and neither [management nor programmers] 
should be caring about actual nitty gritty details of coding 
which is just an artefact of the whole thing. (P6) 
A. Exploration 
Merely identifying the possible attackers and exploits does 
not itself deliver software security. The need is to prevent them 
from causing significant damage to users, stakeholders or 
others. So a development team takes the list of possible attacks, 
and works out possible mitigations for each. These mitigations 
will each have costs in development time, commitment, 
finance, and sometimes usability. The team can estimate 
financial and other costs for each. How, though, do they make 
the decision which to implement? 
Our interviewees conclude that the decision of what aspects 
of security to implement is a commercial one. Implied in every 
decision about software security is a trade-off of the cost of the 
security against the benefit received. Every security 
enhancement needs to be weighed against other uses of the 
investment (financial, time, usability) required.  
[Costly development approaches aren’t] suitable for a lot of 
startups. And the same goes for security. You’re going to have 
to make a security decision upfront. (P1) 
B. Solution 
Interpret the security risks and costs to stakeholders (project 
managers, senior management, customers) in terms they can 
understand and use to prioritize security concerns against other 
organization and project needs. 
[When I started] a project I’d go back and ask [my 
customer]…‘You do realize this [information] can be seen’. It 
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goes from there: ‘how secure do you want it to be?’ You have 
to show that there’s a problem first I think” (P1) 
Here the dialectic is with the stakeholders. The stakeholders 
have knowledge of the importance of different kinds of security 
in the context of the development, that is likely to be very 
different from that of the developers, and it is important that 
this challenges the assumptions of the development team. 
It is hard to over-emphasize the value of the interpretation 
skill. Many of our interviewees made the point that ‘security is 
not an absolute’ – security is what the users and stakeholders 
need for a particular situation at a particular time. For such 
stakeholders to make a good decision on what security to 
implement requires particularly effective communication. The 
stakeholders will be making cost benefit trade-offs comparing 
various business risks. 
You've got to put a weighting on the threat. You've got a 
level of threat, and you've got to put the appropriate level of 
security against that. (P4) 
There are techniques available to give objective assessment 
of security risks, such as work by ben Othmane et al. [38]. 
Vitally – and several interviewees stressed this – the cost-
benefit trade-offs mean that perfect security, even if possible, 
would rarely be a good business decision: 
And actually the way this works, in practice is you have to 
do less than a perfect job, in order to have a measureable 
degree of failure or fraud or whatever, so that you can adjust 
your investment and say ‘I am managing this to an 
economically viable level’ because if it is zero, you have 
invested too much. (P6) 
For simpler projects and systems, there may not be 
sufficient engagement from stakeholders to be able to do this 
kind of trade-off; in that case, it becomes the responsibility of 
the developer: 
[Often it’s impossible to get signoff on security in a big 
company and so the decision is usually down the developer 
because you can’t get the signoff. And in a small company may 
just be the same]. Customers often don’t have a view. The 
important thing is making the decision. (P1) 
Given that each mitigation now has a cost and benefit, the 
decision on whether to do it becomes part of standard project 
management process. It is outside the scope of our theory – and 
indeed of the topic of software security – to explore how to 
make these decisions; the balancing of risk cost and reward is a 
well-understood aspect of business life. 
And it has to be a bit of a trade off as well in terms of 
business. You’ve got to make the trade off as to what’s good 
for getting a solution available now, and having one available 
in a year’s time, which no one will buy, because everyone’s 
gone with one which doesn’t even consider security at all. 
(P12) 






 [What was very successful was] working incredibly closely as 
a team, and having very open discussions with cards on the 
table and removing the fear around discussing aspects of 
security which, I often find in project meetings, people don't 
want to bring up because they don't want to expose their own 
domain. (P8) 
A. Exploration 
Many security issues span a number of teams: development 
teams, operations and even marketing or publicity. Thus there 
is a frequent danger that security problems can ‘fall between 
two stools’, remaining ignored because two teams each think 
the other is responsible for the problem. The problem is 
exacerbated if the developers are not natural communicators, 
I had a core technology group … who worked for me, and 
these guys were double firsts in maths from Cambridge. 
Incredibly bright guys: appalling interpersonal skills. (P5) 
And sometimes by organizational politics, 
You get teams of people who are perhaps very protective of 
their platforms, because they own the system and they are 
master of the system, and they want it to be seen as a golden 
system…  Quite often the people representing the system are 
perhaps one step removed from the real hands-on techies – 
they are generally a manager, who ultimately becomes 
associated with this platform and they feel that their role can 
be at risk if that platform was ever to be undermined … so the 
silos become self-reinforcing and it is very difficult sometimes 
to know whether you have actually been delivered all the facts. 
(P8) 
Or where teams are effectively separated by time – they are 
not working on the project at the same time: 
[There is a big] difference between the operational and 
project approaches. [And security is one thing that is not 
going to get handled by that handover]. That is a real 
challenge. (P8) 
B. Solution 
Ensure frequent and open communication on security 
problems in any way available. The effect of such 
communication is to challenge each team to address the 
security issues – another example of a dialectic process – and to 
allow casual communication about possible security problems. 
Ensure you have considered all the types of team: other 
programmers, operations, and security experts. 
Bringing members of the different teams together on a 
social basis encourages the right kind of communication: 
I am a strong believer in the social aspect of it… I think if 
you can bring people together physically on a regular basis so 
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that you can get to the stage where people are discussing 
family, friends with each other and everything else, it breaks 
down a lot of the artificial barriers that are there. … I do think 
co-location was key, and we would regularly come together, 
we would share a whiteboard and we all had the same view of 
the world. Openness and transparency - I think it makes a 
huge difference. I really do. (P8) 
So does encouraging informal communication on technical 
issues 
 [Of a successful project] I guess we were working with a 
team who were experienced but also everybody who was close 
to the project, lived through the project life cycle to delivery, 
were very comfortable picking the phone up to anybody else 
and discussing any aspect, and everyone reported back quite 
openly what they were seeing, and when we came together. 
(P8) 
An effective but very different form of communication is 
the more formal documentation of responsibilities. One 
straightforward way to do this is a ‘Security Scope’ document 
that identifies the security responsibilities of a given team. That 
highlights where ‘falling between two stools’ problems may 
happen, and is used, for example, in a secure development 
process introduced by the lead author [46]. Where multiple 
organizations are involved, the security scope may even be 
contractual:  
We have got in our contract with [our development 
company] a definitive list of things that they will have failed to 
do their job if they haven't protected against these types of 
attacks. When we find a new one, we try to write a test for it, 
we put it into the document. (P5) 







Nothing gets submitted without it being reviewed by at least 
another engineer. And there are strong processes to protect 
that fact. … The most successful technique has to be review by 
[a security] expert – you can't really beat that – an actual 
conversational review by an expert, because someone who is 
an expert in security might not be an expert in the domain. 
(P3) 
A. Exploration 
It is notoriously difficult to spot one’s own errors. This is 
especially true when the errors are faults in complex reasoning, 
or are due to misunderstandings. Thus, a programmer working 
solo is likely to create avoidable security problems, just 
because they can naturally have only one point of view. 
So it is very easy when you are trying to deliver something 
yourself, as a developer, to pass over the bit that you are not 
doing (P5) 
This problem extends to programming teams; a team will 
always suffer to some extent from ‘groupthink’; the need to 
generate a shared understanding brings with it the danger that 
that understanding may include misunderstandings and blind 
spots.  
B. Solution 
Set up the development so that each person or team has a 
counterpart with a different viewpoint to challenge the security 
and privacy aspect of assumptions, decisions, and code.  
This is perhaps the most obvious example of dialectic in 
security – the counterpart queries the assumptions of the design 
and code, causing developers to review and change their 
understanding. 
There are several common ways of arranging Security 
Challenge: pair programming, security review, code review, 
and penetration testing. Pair programming gives the developer 
the benefit of external questioning: 
Two heads are better than one, more eyes on the problem. 
(P7) 
A security review of the design, technologies and protocols 
of a system, by an experienced secure software expert, is 
particularly effective, and also helps developers to learn more 
of their code base [42]. 
[We have] a separate security review system for, so if you 
are doing code that impacts security in your judgement, it goes 
to people who are security experts who will do the security 
review and they find stuff. (P3) 
For a cloud-based system, the widely accepted way of 
ensuring security is penetration testing, where an external 
‘white hat’ security team simulates what an attacker would do 
to attempt to gain access or disable the service. They then 
feedback any ‘successful’ exploits they have found to the 
development and operations teams.  
[Ensuring software security] tends to get handed off, in 
most companies I've worked with, to a white-hat hacking team. 
[They] don't do it a code level.  (P7) 
At the operating system level, one can also penetration test 
a mobile device: 
I think the one [approach] that has been, arguably, most 
useful has been using specialist external consultancy around 
security. Not for training, but “can you just come in and 
penetration test this device?” (P2) 
The widely used equivalent for an app is an external 
security code review. Many companies now specialize in this 
kind of app security code review; they gather lists of known 
security issues found in apps, with mitigations for each, and 
then review the provided code to look for those security issues. 
Security code reviews are also very effective when internal to a 
company: 
Code review is what we do endlessly. We certainly do not 
let any form of code out the door, without an independent 
review and that is eyeballs on the code and that is discussion 
about the code. (P5) 
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We do code reviews as much as possible. And I point out 
when I think something may have some issues, things like that. 
(P7) 
All of these approaches are expensive; there is a significant 
resource cost to providing the challenge. In the case of pair 
programming, research suggests that the net cost is relatively 
small [13]. However, the other three interventions all represent 
additional costs for an organization, which need to be traded 
against the corresponding benefits: 
You call them out, but ultimately [best] is code level 
reviews, but again it is this balance between the ideal world 
and the timescale, versus the risk and the consequences of the 
risk, or the consequences of an attack. (P7) 
Unfortunately, cost usually makes the external options, 
such as external code review or pen test, unsuitable for solo 
developers. An alternative is ‘Rubber Duck Debugging’ [28]: 
explaining thought processes to an anthropomorphized object. 
IX. AUTOMATED CHALLENGE 




“[The most successful technique I have found is] to use 
various types of Lint checkers” (P7) 
A. Exploration 
Security Challenge can be very effective, but it is costly in 
human effort and impractical in many situations. Few solo app 
developers, for example, will have the money to pay for an 
external review of their code, or the social capital to persuade 
colleagues to do so. Likewise many organizations will not see 
value in paying for penetration testing or external reviewers, 
nor have skills to do either in-house.  
Equally, it is a poor use of expensive resources to find 
problems that are cheap to find in other ways.  
How do we achieve this? 
B. Solution 
Use software tools to create the dialectic. There are two 
areas where automation can help a great deal by challenging 
developers. These are automated code analysis, and automated 
security testing. 
Automated code analysis acts as an extension to the 
compilation process of the code, and looks for possible security 
flaws in the written code. Tools to do this are sometimes called 
‘lint’ checkers, after a UNIX tool that does extra checking for C 
code. There are now many such tools, some produced by 
commercial companies, supporting different languages and 
purposes:  
We use something called Sonar which is a code inspection 
tool. We'd written templates and guides for our coding 
standards and certain patterns we are looking for in a code 
and we are looking for changes in the code that are greater 
than a certain percentage, and there are specific bits of the 
code we are looking for any change that should never happen. 
(P5) 
They are excellent for looking for common errors: 
One of the most common things… for anything using C or 
C++ is to look for potential buffer overruns. And anything that 
has SQL Injections that do the same sorts of things: anything 
that can go outside of the expected bounds, that aren't being 
checked. And there are a number of Lint checkers that will 
pick up on that sort of thing. Use them! (P7) 
Increasingly some of the reviewing features are being 
migrated from independent tools into the compilers default 
build processes for mobile software: 
So as tools get better, for both inspection and fixes, to say 
'hey this might be a security flaw: as the compilers, as the 
development environment, whatever the tools are. Because 
even developers that are experts can make mistakes. And so 
the more the tools do like the code inspection review for you, 
for free, constantly, all the time, so you can't skip it, then yes, 
that will be a huge win.  And I think that can be improved in 
the two year time line. (P3) 
Though of course there is little value to such warnings if the 
programmer ignores them.  
Pay attention to the warnings, pay attention to the Link 
errors. [So it is not just the automated checks. It is the attitude 
towards those automated checks, taking them really seriously] 
Use them, don't forget them. (P7) 
The tools need to be carefully designed to make them easy 
to use; Johnson et al. have made a set of recommendations 
what is required [29]. The tools may be run infrequently, or as 
part of an automated build. Solo developers who lack a stable 
build system will typically run them as part of the release 
preparation process. 
Automated security testing comes in two forms. First is the 
automation of tests that find security defects, to avoid the risk 
that such defects may recur: 
We added an entire section to [our automated testing suite] 
called ‘Security’, which is effectively hacking. We have built 
all forms of vectored attacks against our platform – we 
endlessly think about ways to attack our platform. When we 
find a new one, we try to write a test for it. (P5) 
A second, recent, innovation is to use randomization and 
‘deep learning’ techniques to enable tests that would not 
necessarily occur to a human tester: 
I actually find that our fuzzing efforts, which you could view 
as a form of code analysis, have quite a bit more tangible 
results. The fuzzing effort doesn't happen at code review time, 
but happens at check in time; we have clusters of machines 
where we are doing attacks against the software that is 
checked in, and we are able to find [exploits] very quickly. 
(P11)  
To get the best value, it is important to include both 
automated checks and automated testing as part of the fixed 
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development process. Best practice, given that they are 
automated, is to include them within the build cycle. 
What we do is, [we have] a continual build system. Every 
time someone checks in a change, we create a brand new 
version of [the system]. Once a day we snapshot that version 
… into our testing infrastructure, and for that entire day we 
are doing attacks against the code that is running on that 
device. So next day a new version …, and we continue attacks. 
And we will do that over and over again. (P11) 
X. RESPONSIVE DEVELOPMENT 
Development team Deployed software in use
Responsive 
development
I think one of the problems with remote devices is that these 
devices are intended to be robust against all attackers if you 
lose your device... And that makes it challenging from a 
forensic point of view to look into [issues]. (P11)  
And the patches and updates basically what modern 
security is about – mistakes will be made and when the 
mistakes are found – how do you get the updates out? (P3) 
A. Exploration 
To keep apps secure requires continuous feedback, both to 
detect actual exploits, and to detect trends of use that may 
represent longer-term threats. Getting such feedback is much 
more difficult with mobile apps than with servers. Not only are 
they not always connected, and under the control of someone 
else, but the devices are designed to be as impenetrable as 
possible: 
 [The OS designers] want to make sure that no matter 
whatever privileged position you have, that these devices are 
impenetrable. That is the goal. (P11) 
Responding to such feedback is also a continuous process. 
New exploits, improved processing power, and wider 
publication of existing exploits all mean that what might have 
been secure a year ago may not be now.  
Projects look at the risk here in their lifetime and you know 
the current risk and the current attack vectors, but they are 
constantly changing. (P8) 
It still is interesting to see how effectively security has a 
built in obsolescence. Even with SSL security, which is 
obviously almost the bottom level. (P12) 
The problem is not just the increasing sophistication of 
attacks; changes to the supporting environment often have 
security implications requiring changes to apps to support 
them: 
Obviously given the rate at which Apple and Google are 
changing Android and IOS and all the other things, just almost 
keeping still is difficult. (P12) 
However the nature of app development ‘contracts’, 
whether internal to a company or commercial external contracts 
is often ‘fire and forget’; on completion of the initial app 
development phase, the development team is allocated to 
different projects.  
Like many things that get delivered in a project, the project 
ends and interest dies with it. Unfortunately. And I think you 
lead into a significant challenge in securing things on an 
operational basis. (P8) 
Moreover, it can be very hard to pull together an ad-hoc 
team to solve even serious issues: 
Technology is constantly changing but to bring together the 
spotlight or the focus on a live service, unless it has reached 
the stage that is it almost headline news, is very difficult to do 
because the effort required in creating a project in the first 
instance, to bring together the bodies and the budget for most 
businesses is enormous. So the day to day behavior doesn't 
allow for the ‘dipping into things’. (P8) 
B. Solution 
Instigate a long-term development approach to support both 
security monitoring and regular updating; include logging, and 
other feedback mechanisms within an app. 
Here the dialectic challenges are from the external world – 
users, attackers, and any other influences. Since we need the 
dialectic to be both continuous and two-way, developers must 
use or create specific methods to get and monitor feedback 
from the apps, and project stakeholders need to ensure that 
projects have a continuous long-term support and monitoring 
element, with an explicit mechanism to deliver regular 
enhancements.  
App feedback usually requires explicit functionality: 
I’ve built quite a bit into the apps where they have their own 
debug logs because I don’t trust the likes of Google because 
they have to sanitize what they give you because they’ve got 
privacy issues on their side of things. Because we have more of 
a direct relationship with our users, we can get more 
information and we have them direct to our systems, so 
effectively there’s a low level of logging, logging things which 
are going wrong. (P12) 
Ensuring that updates reach the users can also be a 
problem; many users do not enable automatic upgrades.  
The moment you release something to an Android phone, 
you will, in general, never get a 100% update rate, because 
loads of people update software once and never update. (P3) 
A common solution, implemented in several cases by the 
lead author, for cases where the apps communicate with a 
server, is ‘forced upgrades’ based on the app version number. 
This requires extra support in the app and server: on startup the 
app interrogates the server for the minimum version currently 
supported; if the app’s current version is less, it refuses to run 
and instead directs the user to the appropriate ‘store’ app to 
make the upgrade. 
Getting the resource to deliver regular enhancements 
requires a long-term approach to product development, since 
there will be costs long after the first release. Typically, 
organizations will decide to maintain for a limited time and 
then explicitly stop security updates: 
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It involves engineering resource to do the … updates across 
every product. What we have said is that … the products that 
are currently in this three year window [are maintained] so 
not everything, but the current products, we will keep up to 
date. (P3) 
Thus, we need development contracts (‘maintenance 
contracts’) and system architectures that allow for continued 
app development rather than the more traditional ‘fire and 
forget’ approach. 
XI. DISCUSSION 
The ordering of the techniques is roughly chronological 
from the point of view of the development team. While 
developers use each repeatedly throughout the development 
cycle, they will encounter the need for Brainstormed Attacker 
Profiles and Negotiated Security earlier in each development 
cycle; and the interaction in Responsive Development naturally 
comes rather later.  
A. Relationship to Existing Work 
Comparing the existing work on app developers and 
security, section 2 identified valuable research on current 
practice by developers such as that by Balebako et al. [5]; this 
work goes further by identifying approaches for better practice. 
Much of the remaining literature we discussed is also valuable 
in the context the dialectic techniques as providing solutions to 
the challenges identified through dialectic. Thus an Android 
app programmer who is made aware of security issues from 
Brainstormed Attacker Profiles, Security Challenge or 
Automated Challenge would then be motivated to search for 
solutions on the web or in practitioners’ literature such as 
‘Android Security Internals’ [18]; work by Acar et al. [1] 
suggests that their best choice would be the book . 
Considering the dialectic techniques themselves, we 
suggest that two are reasonably well understood and researched 
in various ways: Security Challenge and Automated Challenge. 
The techniques of Security Challenge of reviews and 
penetration testing are explored in detail in literature; 
Responsive Development is novel in the app development 
context, but the techniques of continuous response to security 
challenges are well known within the context of server system 
management. For Automated Challenge, there is a considerable 
range of automated validation tools available even if, as found 
by Johnson et al. [29], these are currently not often used by 
developers. 
The other three techniques, Brainstormed Attacker Profiles, 
Negotiated Security, and Cross-Team Security Discussion are 
less well reflected in existing security literature; section D 
proposes approaches to research them. However, they do have 
parallels in other aspects of software engineering. Brainstormed 
Attacker Profiles relates to the HCI concept of ‘personas’; 
Atzeni et al. [4], describe an analytic (rather than brainstorm) 
approach to generating attacker personas. Cross-team Security 
Discussion relates to the large amount of work available on 
collaboration between distributed teams [10]. Related to Cross-
team Security Discussion, some new work by Ashenden and 
Lawrence [3] uses an Action Research approach to improve the 
effectiveness of the relationships between security 
professionals and software developers.  
B. Improvements on Existing Practice 
Section II.D identified that existing practice specifies little 
about the team interactions required to achieve software 
security. By contrast, the dialectic techniques constitute a way 
of working, almost an attitude to working, for developers who 
need to deliver secure software. They are completely consistent 
with, and incorporate the thinking of, much existing literature, 
but extend it to provide a new way of looking at 
communication. 
For developers, dialectic provides a set of attitudes to 
development teamwork and approach. It meshes effectively 
with agile self-organizing teams [26]; the developers 
themselves can choose what processes and deliverables best 
serve their ‘dialectic’. What is important is the difference in the 
ways developers interact with the world.  
C. Research Validity 
How certain can we be that this theory accurately reflects 
reality? We approach this question by analyzing threats to 
validity. 
Considering first Conclusion Validity, do the research data 
justify the conclusions? Grounded Theory’s rigorous process of 
line-by-line coding, categorization, and sorting generates a 
theory that does reflect the interview data. The use of extensive 
quotations ensures that this can be at least partially checked. 
In terms of Construct Validity, does the dialectic theory 
represent actual practice? GT handles this primarily in terms of 
‘theoretical saturation’, reached when new interviews do not 
add substantially to the theory. Guest [25] suggests that a dozen 
interviews are often sufficient for this; in this case as 
researchers we believe we have reached theoretical saturation 
with regard to the list of techniques, but not with regard to all 
the potential detail to be uncovered within each technique. 
There is also a risk of bias in the choice of interviewees, and of 
questions; we addressed this with interviewees from a wide 
range of industry roles, and completely open questions. 
In terms of External Validity, can the results be generalized 
to a wider scope? GT’s conclusions are always limited to the 
specific scope studied [11].  In this case, since many of the 
experts were familiar with – and sometimes describing – more 
general secure software development, some conclusions will 
apply to non-app development. We can however make no 
claims of applicability to different development cultures other 
than UK and US-based companies. 
D. Future Work 
Considering the dialectic techniques themselves, we 
suggest that three are reasonably well understood and 
researched in various ways: Security Challenge, Automated 
Challenge, and Responsive Development. We propose further 
research to examine the three less well-understood techniques: 
Brainstormed Attacker Profiles, Negotiated Security, and 
Cross-team Security Discussion.  
It would ask research questions along the lines of:  
 What are the most effective ways to ideate 
understanding of attackers and potential exploits? 
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 How best do we represent security questions in 
business terms? 
 What forms of cross-team interaction are most 
effective to ensure app security? 
 Can team members learn the dialectic approach, or is it 
best used to inform the management and structure of 
teams? 
There are several possible approaches to this research. 
Experimental approaches might set up different groups of 
Computer Science students with different ideation techniques 
and compare their success at identifying attackers and exploits. 
An ethnographic approach might follow the progress of a 
development team, identifying where the major security 
mitigations were identified and how the negotiations took place 
in practice. Alternatively, a survey approach might ask the 
questions of a variety of developers and stakeholders to 
produce a possible consensus. 
A different and potentially very rewarding area of research 
is in further dialectic techniques. For example De Bono [9] has 
defined a variety of ‘Lateral Thinking’ techniques to help teams 
and individuals to challenge their thinking.  
A third area of research is in techniques to introduce the 
dialectic approach to developers. A majority of app developers 
work independently or in relatively small organizations [45]. 
The authors have proposed ways to introduce effective security 
techniques to such individual developers in a recent paper [50]. 
These include: 
 Educational app games for developers to play,  
 Storytelling, through blogs or even TV storylines, and 
 Massively online courses, and TED-style video 
We see these approaches as providing a path to help the 
dialectic techniques to have an impact on development practice 
in the next couple of years. 
XII. CONCLUSION 
In a rigorous study using interviews of experts in secure 
app development, we found three novel aspects. First was an 
emphasis on programmers’ activities, in addition to the artifacts 
delivered. Second was a discrepancy between current industry 
understanding of good security practice, and experts’ 
recommendations. Last was a theory that emphasises the nature 
of a specific kind of communication and interaction with 
developers: dialectic. 
We concluded that techniques for software security may 
best be expressed in terms of the dialectic nature of the 
developers’ own interactions, and not solely in terms of formal 
processes, artefacts and reports. 
Section 4 describes six dialectic techniques, each involving 
continuous challenging dialog with a different counterparty. 
We suggest that these techniques are well suited for app 
development teams in the majority of organizations. We shall 
investigate the techniques further as discussed in section XI.D; 
we shall also look for ways to disseminate them more widely, 
and research interventions to introduce them into a range of 
existing development teams. 
Using these techniques, we believe, has the potential to 
enhance the future security of apps, and lead to better safety for 
all of those who use them. 
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